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Before we commence our discussion of the topic, we want to acknowledge 
the quality and value of David Butler’s work on the business trust. For 32 
successive years, David taught a module in corporate law to commerce 
students and in later years a significant portion of that module was devoted to 
the business trust. David’s notes on the topic became legendary. Our Faculty’s 
Department of Mercantile Law regularly received requests from former 
students for copies of David’s notes on the business trust. Only after entering 
practice did they realise the wealth of insight and knowledge captured in these 
notes.
It was an enormous privilege to have worked with David Butler. His 
friendship, intellect, sense of humour and, above all, the way in which he 
cares for people, have always been an inspiration to both of us.
1  Introduction
Numerous examples in recent case law illustrate both the importance and 
the practical relevance of the so-called “joint-action rule” in South African 
trust law.1 The exact meaning of this rule, as well as the principle on which 
it is founded, will be addressed in the proper context below.2 By way of 
introduction it would be sufficient to say that the rule implies that, outside 
of provisions in the trust deed to the contrary, co-trustees of a trust must act 
jointly if they want to bind the trust. Already this brief formulation can explain 
why the rule has proved to be of practical significance. Non-compliance with 
the rule could (and most often would) result in the invalidity of a contract 
* The part of this article which deals with comparative research draws on a chapter in I du Plessis’s LLD 
dissertation
1 For reported cases, see for example Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 
(WCC); Steyn v Blockpave (Pty) Ltd 2011 3 SA 528 (FB); Pascoal v Wurdeman 2012 3 SA 422 (GSJ); 
O’Shea NO v Van Zyl 2012 1 SA 90 (SCA) para 23; Lynn NO v Coreejes 2012 1 All SA 620 (SCA)  For 
a discussion of and references to quite a number of unreported cases, see MJ de Waal “The Law of 
Succession (Including the Administration of Estates) and Trusts” (2010) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1170 1199-1202; MJ de Waal “The Law of Succession (Including the Administration of Estates) 
and Trusts” (2011) Annual Survey of South African Law 1033 1066-1069; MJ de Waal “The Law of 
Succession (Including the Administration of Estates) and Trusts” (2012) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 831 850-852
2 See part 3 1 below
       
entered into between the trustees and an outsider, probably with detrimental 
results on one or both sides.3
It has been suggested that the joint-action rule is “generally unproblematic” 
with regard to charitable trusts or trusts where the trustees’ main function 
is the conservation of property for beneficiaries; but that the rule has posed 
“numerous challenges” with regard to trusts used to conduct business or 
to undertake commercial activities (that is, business trusts).4 Of course, it 
is not difficult to see why this is so. The nature of trusts in a business or 
commercial environment normally dictates an active role for the trustees 
in the day-to-day running of the particular business. Strict adherence to 
the joint-action rule would therefore require very regular meetings of (or at 
least communication between) the trustees. As most businesses could not be 
run effectively in this way, there are practical means available to soften the 
application of the rule under such circumstances. One possibility is that a 
provision allowing a deviation from the joint-action rule can be inserted in 
a trust deed – for example by stipulating that decisions can be taken by a 
majority of the trustees.5 However, trustees often misunderstand the operation 
and limitations of such a provision, and they therefore do not realise that it 
would not necessarily address the problem at hand adequately.6 An alternative 
– and in our view more effective – approach would be to employ the normal 
principles of the law of agency in this context. A trust deed could therefore 
contain a provision stipulating that the trustees can delegate certain defined 
duties or powers (also generally referred to as trustee “functions” in this 
article) to one of their co-trustees or even to an outsider.7 This trustee could 
then (and bearing compliance with the principles of delegation and apposite 
statutory provisions in mind), for example, enter into valid contracts with 
outsiders without the necessity of prior trustee meetings (even ones at which 
a majority vote is allowed).
It is thus clear that certain mechanisms can be put into place in order to 
ameliorate the problematical practical effects of the joint-action rule. However, 
it is also clear that pitfalls remain for trustees and other trust practitioners, and 
that our courts still face challenges in developing trust law in this particular 
area.8 It has therefore been submitted, rightly in our view, “that the joint-action 
rule in regard to co-trusteeship will remain a focal point of future judicial 
development of South African trust law”.9 The primary aim of this article is 
to illustrate that in this process of judicial development our courts can derive 
much benefit from also looking further afield to other trust law jurisdictions. 
This is because even a relatively brief comparative exercise will show that there 
3 For examples, see the cases referred to in n 1 above and in nn 5 and 7 below
4 F du Toit “Co-Trusteeship and the Joint-Action Rule in South African Trust Law” (2013) 27 Trust Law 
International 18 19
5 See, for example, Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 15; Du 
Toit (2013) Trust Law International 22-23
6 See part 3 1 below
7 See, for example, Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 3 SA 486 (SCA) paras 6 and 23; Du Toit 
(2013) Trust Law International 23-24
8 See Du Toit (2013) Trust Law International 19
9 29
344 STELL LR 2014 2
       
is indeed much common ground, but also instructive differences, between 
South Africa and a number of other trust jurisdictions regarding both the 
joint-action rule and the delegation of trustee functions. Solutions generated 
in these jurisdictions could therefore also guide South African courts when 
they are confronted with challenges in this area of trust law. For purposes of 
this comparative exercise we have chosen two common-law jurisdictions,10 
namely English and Canadian trust law, and two mixed legal jurisdictions,11 
namely Scotland and Quebec. The two common-law jurisdictions have been 
chosen to show that, despite certain fundamental differences in approach to 
trust law,12 there are indeed many important and useful points of contact to 
be found in this particular context. The two mixed legal jurisdictions have 
been chosen in order to provide a direct analogy with South Africa, another 
prime example of such a jurisdiction. Note, however, that both Scotland and 
Quebec are parts of larger political entities (the United Kingdom and Canada, 
respectively) and that they do not constitute independent states as is the 
case with South Africa. We will therefore refer to “England” and “the rest 
of Canada” when we deal with the purely common-law component of each 
broader jurisdiction.
We have already emphasised that the joint-action rule is of particular 
significance with regard to business trusts. It is therefore first necessary to 
give some perspective on the use of trusts in a business environment and, 
especially, to explain why trusts have proved to be effective and popular 
institutions in this context.
2  The use of trusts in a business environment: context and 
rationale
In what is still regarded as a seminal contribution on the topic of business 
trusts in South Africa, Wunsh defined this type of trust as follows:
“A trust will be regarded as a business trust if it is used for carrying on a business for profit, including 
the owning and letting of property, as distinguished from one designed to protect and conserve 
assets.”13
Although trusts of this description are no doubt quite common in South 
Africa, it is surprising how little they have featured in case law. Earlier 
examples include Goodricke & Son (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Natal14 
10 Meaning, systems based on the English common law
11 J du Plessis “Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems” in M Reimann & R Zimmermann 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 477 478 describes a mixed legal system as a 
“group of legal systems or jurisdictions which have been shaped so significantly by both the civil law and 
common law traditions that they cannot be brought home comfortably under either”
12 Certainly the most fundamental difference is the idea that in the common law, trust ownership of the 
trust property is, according to the principles of equity, “split” or “divided” between the trustee and the 
trust beneficiary: the trustee thus holds “legal” (or common-law) ownership and the trust beneficiary 
“beneficial” (or “equitable”) ownership  For the significance of this in the legal comparative context, 
see in general MJ de Waal “The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the English, Scottish and South 
African Trusts Compared” (2000) 117 SALJ 548; GL Gretton “Trusts without Equity” (2000) 49 ICLQ 
599
13 B Wunsh “Trading and Business Trusts” (1986) 103 SALJ 561
14 1974 1 SA 404 (N)
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(where trust funds were used to provide a loan on interest) and Pretorius v 
CIR15 (where tenants of flats in a building set up a trust in order to enable them 
to obtain ownership of the flats).16 More recently business trusts featured in 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies 
(Edms) Bpk17 (“Nieuwoudt”), Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v 
Parker18 (“Parker”) and Badenhorst v Badenhorst19 (“Badenhorst”) (where 
the trusts in question were used to conduct farming businesses), and in 
Lupacchini NO v Minister of Safety and Security20 (where a trust conducted 
the business of a nightclub). In Badenhorst, for example, the court described 
the situation as one in which the respondent used the particular trust “as a 
vehicle for his business activities”.21 Note also that in both Nieuwoudt and 
Parker non-compliance with the joint-action rule was central to the issues 
at hand.
Of course, on a scale of complexity, size and sophistication the examples 
of business trusts mentioned above find themselves at the modest end, often 
in the context of families or business partners conducting relatively small 
enterprises (although at times with considerable sums of money involved).22 
But studies have argued that the real (in fact, “secret”)23 life of the business 
trust is really at the other end of the scale. Here one finds complex and 
sophisticated trust structures in which, generally speaking, assets of great 
value are held. In an oft-quoted study focusing on the United States of 
America, Langbein identified numerous trust structures falling into this 
category.24 Examples include pension trusts, investment trusts (in the guises 
of, for example, mutual funds, real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) and 
asset securitisation) and regulatory compliance trusts.25 Probably the best 
example of this type of business trust in South Africa is the so-called unit 
trust, regulated in terms of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 
45 of 2002.26 Other examples include trusts in Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment structures (“B-BBEE” structures)27 and trusts as “special 
purpose institutions”, especially in the securitisation business.28
15 1984 2 SA 619 (T)
16 See Wunsh (1986) SALJ 564-568 for an analysis of these two cases
17 2004 3 SA 486 (SCA)
18 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA)
19 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA)
20 2010 6 SA 457 (SCA)
21 Para 10
22 See, for example, Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) where the 
trust conducting the farming business at one stage borrowed R30 million from the bank (para 4) and 
eventually allegedly owed the bank R16 million (para 1)
23 See the reference in n 24 below  
24 JH Langbein “The Secret Life of the Trust: the Trust as an Instrument of Commerce” (1997) 107 Yale LJ 
165
25 167-175  See also TE Rutledge & CE Schaefer “The Trust as an Entity and Diversity Jurisdiction: is 
Navarro Applicable to the Modern Business Trust?” (2013) 48 Real Property, Trust and Estate LJ 83 90:
“Today, the business trust may be used for a variety of applications, although they are best known for 
use in the structuring of mutual funds, in real estate investment trusts, and in asset securitization ”
26 This Act repealed and replaced the Unit Trusts Control Act 54 of 1981
27 RP Pace & WM van der Westhuizen Wills and Trusts (RS 17 2013) B4 2 2 1, who point out that B-BBEE 
trust deeds in South Africa are mostly structured as “bewind” trusts (where ownership vests in the trust 
beneficiaries) in order to meet with the ownership requirements in codes of conduct
28 E Nel, V Lawack & A van der Walt “The Trust as Special-Purpose Institution” (2013) 34 Obiter 111
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However, for present purposes the main question remains: why is the trust 
such an effective and popular institution in the business environment? At what 
has been called “the more modest end of the scale” above, the less stringent 
regulation of business trusts (including the general absence of disclosure 
obligations) as opposed to the position in other formal business structures 
may prove attractive.29 But in our view the heart of the matter is the fact 
that – regardless of where on the scale the trust in question is situated – all the 
fundamental trust law principles are drawn into that particular context and 
find application for the protection of, especially, the beneficiaries of the trust. 
In a wide-ranging comparative and economic analysis of the functions of trust 
law, Hansmann and Mattei have put this idea in the following terms:
“So long as the parties characterize the relationship they wish to establish as a ‘trust’, or even if 
they just make clear their intention to create a trust-like relationship, the law of trusts automatically 
inserts a variety of standard terms into their agreement. These terms comprise the core of the trust 
relationship.”30
These “standard terms” or “standard features” – which partly correspond 
with what has elsewhere been termed the “core elements” of a trust31 – are by 
way of summary (and as far as relevant here):32
(i) The “protective regime of trust fiduciary law”33 is activated. This entails 
that the trustee, being in a fiduciary position, must act in a particular 
fashion with regard to the trust and its beneficiaries. Much can be said on 
this topic,34 but Langbein captures the idea well insofar as he emphasises 
two specific trustee duties:35 the duty of loyalty (meaning that the trust 
must be administered solely in the interest of the beneficiaries); and the 
duty of prudent administration (meaning that the trustee must exercise 
special care and skill in his or her dealings with trust property).
(ii) A regime of separation of estates is activated. This entails that trust 
assets must be kept separate from the trustee’s personal assets in order 
to protect them from the trustee’s personal creditors should the trustee 
become insolvent. This idea is sometimes expressed by saying that the 
trust assets are “ring-fenced”;36 that the trust is “bankruptcy remote”;37 
or “insolvency remote”.38
(iii) The trust’s “flexibility of design in matters of governance and in 
the structuring of beneficial interests”39 is imported. This feature is 
significant for two reasons: first, it explains why the trust can be employed 
29 See in general Wunsh (1986) SALJ 568-573  See also L Theron “Die Besigheidstrust” (1991) TSAR 268 
272-282
30 H Hansmann & U Mattei “The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis” 
(1998) 73 NYU L Rev 434 447
31 See De Waal (2000) SALJ 557-567.
32 Langbein (1997) Yale LJ 179  See also Hansmann & Mattei (1998) NYU L Rev 447-448
33 Langbein (1997) Yale LJ 179
34 See also De Waal (2000) SALJ 557-559 and the references there
35 Langbein (1997) Yale LJ 182
36 E Dirix & V Sagaert “Trusts in European Civil Law: on Building Bridges and Trojan Horses” in H 
Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 275 280
37 Hansmann & Mattei (1998) NYU L Rev 468; Langbein (1997) Yale LJ 173
38 Nel et al (2013) Obiter 119
39 Langbein (1997) Yale LJ 179
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in such a variety of contexts, including this wide spectrum of business 
uses; second, it gives the parties to a trust great scope in tailoring their 
particular trust deed in such a way that specific needs or requirements 
can be addressed. An example falling in the second category (and which 
is, of course, relevant for present purposes) is the ability of parties to 
deviate from the joint-action rule or to delegate certain powers to one of 
the co-trustees.
The use of a trust for business purposes thus brings with it – through the 
importation of these standard features – important advantages that need not 
be specifically bargained for. But at the same time the parties to a trust cannot 
escape the other normal principles of trust law. For example, the normal 
requirements for the establishment of a valid trust remain applicable and 
they must be satisfied before a trust can come into existence.40 And to the 
extent that there may be “gaps” in the legislation regulating complex trust 
structures such as mutual funds or collective investment schemes, normal 
trust law principles may be activated to fill these “gaps”.41 Moreover, the 
normal principles and rules of trust administration remain applicable. The 
joint-action rule, as the focus of this article, is one of these rules and in the 
next part it will be subjected to the comparative analysis referred to above.
3  A comparative analysis of the joint-action rule and possible 
deviations from it
3 1  South Africa
Once it is established that a valid trust has been formed, certain 
consequences follow. One relates to the administration of the trust. Regarding 
the internal administration of the trust, the trust deed usually provides when, 
where and how meetings of trustees should be held, and the procedures to 
be followed at these meetings.42 It has also been suggested that if there is 
more than one trustee, a chairperson should be appointed.43 In the absence of 
provisions dealing with the issue, meetings should be held at the place and on 
intervals as the chairperson may direct, but a meeting should be held at least 
40 See Nel et al (2013) Obiter 121 who very specifically refer to these requirements in their discussion of the 
trust as a “special purpose institution” (that is, in the context of business trusts)
41 See in general B Austin & P Dimitriadis “Not All Trust Law Principles Apply to Pension Trusts: the 
Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Buschau v Rogers Communications Inc” (2006-2007) Estates, 
Trusts & Pensions Journal 217 228 who put this proposition in a reverse form with reference to Canadian 
pension fund law:
“It could be argued that where there is no ‘gap in the legislation’, there is no need to apply trust law 
principles to determining pension plan issues  In such cases, issues should be determined based on the 
legislation, which has arguably displaced the common law ”
The judgment in Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank Ltd 2007 2 SA 570 (SCA) provides a 
very good example of the application of normal trust law principles in the context of collective investment 
schemes in South Africa
42 Du Toit (2013) Trust Law International 21
43 E Cameron, M de Waal, B Wunsh, P Solomon & E Kahn Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed 
(2002) 312
348 STELL LR 2014 2
       
once a year, or more if the standard of conduct expected of trustees44 requires 
it.45
Cameron et al argue that trustees must act jointly regarding internal 
administration.46 What is trite, though, is that in dealings with outsiders 
all the trustees must act jointly in order to bind the trust (in the absence of 
contrary provisions in the trust deed).47 Indeed, in Land and Agricultural 
Bank of South Africa v Parker Cameron JA (as he then was) described the 
duty to act jointly as “forming the basis of trust law in this country”.48 He also 
reiterated that the duty derives from the nature of the trustees’ joint ownership 
of the trust property.49 As indicated, a provision allowing a deviation from the 
joint-action rule can be inserted in a trust deed – for example by stipulating 
that decisions can be taken by a majority of the trustees.50 However, there is 
a qualification that is often overlooked by trustees. In Parker, Cameron JA 
stressed that this majority remains part of the full trustee complement and that 
it must therefore “exercise its will in relation to that complement”.51 In practice 
all the trustees must therefore be consulted and be given an opportunity to 
take part in the decision-making process, even if one or more of them may 
ultimately be outvoted by the majority.52
Outsiders dealing with a trust should therefore assume that all the trustees 
of a trust must act jointly when contracting on behalf of the trust, unless the 
trust deed contains provisions to the contrary.53 But, as indicated, contrary 
provisions of this nature (such as a provision allowing decisions to be taken 
by a majority vote) have their own limitations. Moreover, the joint-action rule 
as just explained must be clearly distinguished from what was referred to 
as a “capacity-defining condition” in Parker. The typical example of such 
a condition (and one that was also relevant in Parker) is a stipulation in a 
trust deed that there must always be a certain minimum number of trustees in 
office. This is how Cameron JA explained the concept:
“It lays down a prerequisite that must be fulfilled before the trust estate can be bound. When fewer 
trustees than the number specified are in office, the trust suffers from an incapacity that precludes 
action on its behalf.”54
In other words, if a trust deed specifies that there must always be (for 
example) a minimum of three trustees and one trustee dies, the remaining 
two trustees cannot bind the trust estate – even if they act jointly. This was 
44 In terms of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, s 9(1), trustees must act with the care, diligence and 
skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another
45 Cameron et al Honoré 322
46 324
47 342; F du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 2 ed (2007) 97; Du Toit (2013) Trust Law 
International 18
48 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 15  See also Coetzee v Peet 
Smith Trust 2003 5 SA 674 (T) (for the relevance of unanimous decision-making); Pascoal v Wurdeman 
2012 3 SA 422 (GSJ) para 19
49 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 15
50 See also part 1 above
51 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 17
52 See De Waal (2011) Annual Survey of South African Law 1067
53 Cameron et al Honoré 324; Du Toit (2013) Trust Law International 22
54 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 11
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the important point that was made in Lynn NO v Coreejes55 where Majiedt 
JA declared that “even where trustees act jointly, they cannot in law bind the 
trust estate where they are not the requisite number stipulated in the trust 
deed …”.56
Hence, and to enable the trust to function effectively, the trust deed often 
provides for the appointment of an executive or managing trustee who takes 
care of running the trust’s affairs.57 This trustee can be authorised in terms 
of an explicit provision in the trust deed or in terms of express or implied 
authorisation granted to this trustee by the other trustees in accordance with 
the trust deed.58 Grainco (Pty) Ltd v Broodryk NO59 (“Grainco”) provides an 
excellent example of the implied authorisation of a co-trustee in a business 
trust context. In Grainco the trustees conducted a farming business through 
the trust. The trust had only two trustees, namely the first defendant and 
his 82 year-old mother (the second defendant). The joint-action rule was 
confirmed in the trust deed in that it required all trustee decisions to be taken 
unanimously.60 According to Cillié J, it would have been “naïve” to think that 
the first defendant obtained the consent of the second defendant each time 
he conducted the trust’s business. The necessary inference (“onafwendbare 
afleiding”) was therefore that the first defendant had received a general 
authorisation from the second defendant to manage the affairs of the trust.61
But note that in practice there might be potential pitfalls regarding such an 
authorisation. Perhaps the most significant one is section 2(1) of the Alienation 
of Land Act 68 of 1981 that provides that no alienation of land “shall … be 
of any force or effect unless it is contained in a deed of alienation signed by 
the parties thereto or by their agents acting on their written authority”. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has held in Thorpe v Trittenwein62 that a contract of 
sale for the alienation of land is invalid if it is concluded by a trustee without 
the written authorisation of his or her co-trustees.63 In other words, even 
if such a trustee has in fact been authorised by his or her co-trustees, the 
contract would under these circumstances be invalid unless the authorisation 
has been in writing.
Also, trustees may delegate some of their functions, such as the everyday 
administration of the trust, to others, for example, an outside company.64 
Trustees are also allowed to consult experts.65 Trustees are not permitted to 
55 2012 1 All SA 620 (SCA)
56 Para 9
57 Du Toit South African Trust Law 98; Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 5 SA 674 (T); Du Toit (2013) Trust 
Law International 23
58 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 3 SA 486 (SCA) paras 6 and 23; Du Toit South African 
Trust Law 98; Du Toit (2013) Trust Law International 23
59 2012 4 SA 517 (FB) and see De Waal (2012) Annual Survey of South African Law 851
60 Grainco (Pty) Ltd v Broodryk NO 2012 4 SA 517 (FB) para 6 1
61 Para 6 4
62 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA)
63 For subsequent cases in which Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA) was applied, see for example 
Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC); Jansen NO v Ringwood 
Investments 87 CC (59771/2009) 2013 ZAGPPHC 129 (20 May 2013) SAFLII <http://www saflii org/za/
cases/ZAGPPHC/2013/129 html> (accessed 28-05-2013)
64 Cameron et al Honoré 326; Du Toit (2013) Trust Law International 22
65 Cameron et al Honoré 328; Du Toit South African Trust Law 96
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abdicate their responsibilities, though, and such abdication may lead to the 
invalidity of the act.66 Trustees therefore are the only ones who can make the 
decisions regarding the achievement of the trust object and remain responsible 
for such achievement, even if they have handed over certain (lesser) functions 
to others. Fundamental decisions regarding the trust should therefore be taken 
by the trustees, but implementation may be delegated to others.67 In South 
Africa it is certainly possible that, if a trust deed allows it, one of a number 
of co-trustees may be authorised by the remaining trustees to conclude a 
contract (or contracts of a specified nature) on behalf of the trust. This could 
indeed be one of the more effective ways of avoiding the practical difficulties 
with the application of the joint-action rule.
Trustees, however, retain the duty to supervise the work of any person to 
whom a task was delegated.68 In Hoosen NO v Deedat,69 one of the trustees 
suffered a stroke which left him sound of mind, but incapable of attending 
meetings of the trustees and performing related duties as trustee. He therefore 
granted a special power of attorney to his daughter-in-law to represent him at 
meetings of the trustees, thereby transferring all his rights, duties and powers 
(including the power to vote at meetings as she pleased) to his daughter-in-law. 
The court had to decide whether the trustee was entitled in law to delegate his 
functions qua trustee in terms of the power of attorney to his daughter-in-
law. The court held that the trust deed did not provide, either expressly or 
impliedly, that such a delegation could take place. According to the court this 
accorded with the principle that fundamental decisions relating to the trust 
had to be taken by the trustees. Hence the delegation to the daughter-in-law 
was legally impermissible.
3 2  England
The general powers of administration of a trust are placed in the hands of 
the trustees.70 In terms of the common law, trustees must act jointly, unless 
the trust deed provides otherwise.71
Each of the trustees must act personally, save to the extent that a trustee 
may delegate to other trustees or agents in terms of the Trustee Act 2000.72 
In terms of this Act trustees may authorise any person to exercise any or all 
of their delegable functions as their agent. The trustees’ delegable functions 
consist of any function other than
(i) any function relating to whether or in what way any assets of the trust 
should be distributed;
66 Hoosen and Other NNO v Deedat 1999 4 SA 425 (SCA)
67 Cameron et al Honoré 327; Du Toit South African Trust Law 97
68 Cameron et al Honoré 328
69 1999 4 SA 425 (SCA)
70 G Moffat, G Bean & R Probert Trusts Law 5 ed (2009) 434; Trustee Act (1925) Pt II
71 D Waters Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada 4 ed (2012) ch 18 1 11; G Thomas & A Hudson The Law of 
Trusts (2004) 342-343; A Hudson Equity and Trusts 7 ed (2013) 348
72 D Hayton The Law of Trusts 4 ed (2003) 142; J Riddall The Law of Trusts 6 ed (2002) 317; Hudson Equity 
and Trusts 353
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(ii) any power to decide whether any fees or other payment due to be made 
out of the trust funds should be made out of income or capital;
(iii) any power to appoint a person to be a trustee of the trust; or
(iv) any power conferred by any other enactment or the trust deed which 
permits the trustees to delegate any of their functions or to appoint a 
person to act as a nominee or custodian.73
The trustees may not permit an agent to appoint a substitute, to act in 
circumstances capable of giving rise to a conflict of interest, or restrict the 
agent’s liability to the trustees or any beneficiary.74 Special rules apply when 
an agent is authorised to act as asset manager for the trustees, such as that the 
agreement must be in writing and that trustees must prepare a written policy 
statement which gives guidance to the agent as to how his or her functions 
must be performed.75 While the agent acts for the trust, the trustees must keep 
under review the arrangements under which the agent acts and how those 
arrangements are being put into effect. They must also consider whether there 
is a need to exercise any power of intervention that they have and exercise 
such a power if necessary. “Power of intervention” includes a power to give 
directions and to revoke the authorisation or appointment.76 The provisions of 
the Trustee Act set out above may be restricted or excluded by the trust deed.77
The Trustee Act 192578 provides that an individual trustee may delegate the 
execution or exercise of all or any of the trusts, powers and discretions vested 
in him or her as trustee.79 The delegation must be given in terms of a written 
power of attorney and may continue for a maximum of twelve months.80 The 
trustee, however, remains liable for the acts of the person to whom he or she 
has delegated. A trustee may also delegate his or her discretion in terms of the 
trust deed.81
3 3  Scotland
The general principles regarding trust administration are that trustees must 
perform their functions personally and, where there is more than one trustee, 
must act as a body, on the basis that each individual takes responsibility for 
every step of the administration of the trust. Due to practical considerations 
and business efficacy, these principles have been relaxed in certain respects. 
More specifically, the relaxation of these principles relates to the extent to 
which trustee decisions may be taken without every trustee partaking or 
agreeing (that is, the first issue discussed herein) and the circumstances 
73 S 11(2) of the Trustee Act
74 S 14(2) and (3)
75 S 15
76 S 22
77 S 26  For a general discussion on the delegation of trustees’ duties, see Hudson Equity and Trusts 480-485
78 The Trustee Act was amended by the Trustee Delegation Act 1999
79 S 25
80 The power of attorney must be attested to by a witness (Hayton The Law of Trusts 156)
81 Moffat et al Trusts Law 528
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under which the trustees may delegate their duties (that is, the second issue 
discussed herein).82
Regarding the first issue, trust deeds under Scots law may lay down certain 
rules for the conduct of the trust’s administration, but in the absence of 
rules in the trust deed certain default rules will apply. Thus, these default 
rules determine that a quorum of trustees must be present in order for a 
valid meeting to be held and that the majority of trustees are a quorum.83 
Furthermore, decisions are made by majority vote,84 but the majority must 
be the majority of all the trustees and not just those present at the meeting.85 
In Wolfe v Richardson,86 the testator appointed eight persons as trustees of a 
testamentary trust. One of the assets of the trust was shares in a company and 
all eight of the trustees unanimously appointed one of the trustees to attend, 
vote and act for the trustees at meetings of the company. Subsequently, two 
trustees resigned, but a dispute arose amongst the remaining six trustees. At 
a trustee meeting, three of the trustees moved to revoke the mandate earlier 
awarded to the one trustee, but that trustee and the two remaining trustees 
resisted. Consequently, the resolution could not be passed or defeated and 
a deadlock arose. The three trustees who had proposed the resolution then 
informed the relevant trustee (and the two others) that he no longer had 
authority to act under the mandate. Before the court the three trustees who 
had proposed the resolution argued that a quorum was the majority of trustees 
and that no quorum of trustees had acquiesced to the continuance of the 
relevant trustee’s mandate. The court agreed with this argument, stating that 
the relevant trustee no longer had the authority to represent the trustees.
However, all trustees must be “consulted” and a failure to consult may lead 
to an invalid decision.87 All that is required for “consultation” to take place, 
is for the trustees to be notified of a meeting that is to take place and that 
fair notice be given,88 but even this is unnecessary if it would be pointless or 
impossible to do so.89 Wilson and Duncan insist, however, that in impractical 
or impossible cases, consultation by written or telephonic communication 
must take place.90
82 W Wilson & A Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 2 ed (1995) 362  The authors do not list the 
practical considerations, but one can think of the practical difficulties involved in having the day-to-day 
affairs of a trust dealt with by all the trustees, especially where there are many trustees involved, as an 
example of these practical considerations
83 365; Trusts (Scotland) Act (1921) s 3(c)
84 A Garden & S Mackintosh Trusts and Estates in Scotland 2009/2010 (2009) 5; Wilson & Duncan Trusts, 
Trustees and Executors 362
85 G Gretton, A Steven & A Struthers Property, Trusts and Succession (2009) 343  In cases where trustees 
are appointed on a basis of joint tenure or if they are designated sine qua non, all of these trustees must 
participate, or at least concur, in all acts of the administration of the trust (Wilson & Duncan Trusts, 
Trustees and Executors 362)  These arrangements are rare in practice, but see part 3 1 above for the 
analogy with the position in South African law regarding the restrictions on a “majority-vote” provision 
in a trust deed
86 1927 S L T 490
87 Wilson & Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 359  See also Wyse v Abbott (1881) 8 R 983  
88 Wilson & Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 363
89 Gretton et al Property, Trusts and Succession 344
90 Wilson & Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 363
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If trustees dispose of trust property, a dissenting trustee has a duty to sign 
the documents required for the disposition to take place, but it is uncertain 
whether, as a matter of conveyancing law, the signatures of the majority would 
be adequate.91
Regarding the rights of third parties, the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 
provides as follows:
“Any deed bearing to be granted by the trustees under any trust, and in fact executed by a quorum 
of such trustees in favour of any person other than a beneficiary or a co-trustee under the trust where 
such person has dealt onerously and in good faith shall not be void or challengeable on the ground 
that any trustee or trustees under the trust was or were not consulted in the matter, or was or were not 
present at any meeting of trustees where the same was considered, or did not consent to or concur in 
the granting of the deed, or on the ground of any other omission or irregularity of procedure on the 
part of the trustees or any of them in relation to the granting of the deed.”92
Regarding the second issue, namely the delegation of authority, legislation 
provides that trustees may appoint factors93 and law agents and pay them 
suitable remuneration, unless such power is at variance with the terms of the 
trust deed or purpose of the trust.94 In addition and at common law, trustees 
have the power to appoint agents.95 If this power is exercised properly, it is not 
regarded as a delegation of functions which trustees are obliged to perform 
personally. The power may be exercised if a person of reasonable prudence 
dealing with his or her own affairs would consider the employment of an 
agent appropriate. Indeed, it seems that it is a trustee’s duty to use suitable 
agents such as solicitors in relation to matters for which a trustee does not 
possess the necessary skills.96 The matters in relation to which agents may be 
appointed may be as limited or as extensive as the circumstances require.97 
In Scott v Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd,98 the court stated that it 
was a fundamental rule that a trustee may not delegate his trust. However, 
it was also clear that a trustee is not obliged to perform each and every duty 
personally and that a trustee could appoint an agent. According to the court, 
these two principles do not conflict. Rather, the “dividing line” was “that the 
trustee must never surrender his own judgment in matters committed to his 
discretion, since the confidence of the truster was placed in his discretion and 
his alone”.99
91 Gretton et al Property, Trusts and Succession 344
92 S 7 of the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921
93 According to Wilson and Duncan, the term “factor” implies “a range of activities extending beyond the 
exclusive province of solicitors” (Wilson & Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 368)  
94 S 4(f) of the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921
95 Hay v Binny (1861) 23 D 594
96 Wilson & Duncan Trusts, Trustees and Executors 367
97 370  This statement by Wilson and Duncan was approved in Scott v Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) 
Ltd 1990 S L T  882 886
98 1990 S L T  882
99 886  The South African equivalent of the term “truster” is “founder” and in the United Kingdom and 
Canada the term “settlor” is usually used
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3 4  The rest of Canada
All the trustees must act jointly, unless the trust deed provides otherwise.100 
In other words, their decisions must be unanimous and if one trustee does not 
agree with the others, a deadlock arises. One way of breaking the deadlock is 
to approach the court for direction, although this remedy may be of limited 
use as the courts are hesitant to interfere with the trustees’ exercising of their 
duties.101 A trustee may delegate his or her functions to other trustees under 
the same circumstances as those required for delegation to others.102
The general rule is, therefore, that trustees must act personally and may not 
delegate their functions to others.103 However, under certain circumstances, 
the trustees are entitled to delegate their functions, although they will remain 
responsible for making all decisions. These circumstances are:
(i) if the trust deed or statute expressly permits it;
(ii) if the duties are not required to be performed personally;
(iii) where there is no other possible way for the trustee to perform, that is, it 
is necessary; and
(iv) it is common business practice to do so.104
Waters also acknowledges that trustees may delegate their functions, but 
formulates the circumstances under which they may do so as follows:
“[W]henever the power, discretion, or duty assigned to the trustee requires that a policy decision be 
made, the trustee must make it himself. A policy decision is one which, if dispositive, determines how 
much and at what time a beneficiary takes; if administrative, it directly affects the likelihood of the 
trust’s object or purpose being achieved.”105
Trustees may never delegate all of their functions as it would amount to 
an abdication of responsibility.106 However, legislation in certain provinces 
enables a trustee, who is going to be absent from the province, to delegate all 
of his or her functions.107 Some provinces also enacted legislation to enable 
trustees to employ certain agents, for example solicitors or bank managers.108
3 5  Québec
The trustee has full administration of the trust property.109 He or she 
therefore has the control and the exclusive administration of the trust 
patrimony, and the titles relating to the property of which it is composed are 
100 Waters Waters’ Law of Trusts ch 18 I 4
101 A Oosterhoff, R Chambers, M McInnes & L Smith Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials 
6 ed (2004) 935
102 Waters Waters’ Law of Trusts ch 18 I 4
103 Ch 18 I 1
104 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts 950
105 Waters Waters’ Law of Trusts ch 18 I 2
106 Oosterhoff et al Oosterhoff on Trusts 950
107 British Columbia, but only for absence on war service (Trustee Act RSBC 1996 ch 464 s 14); Manitoba 
(Trustee Act CCSM ch T-160 s 36); New Brunswick (Trustees Act RSNB 1973 ch T-15 s 6)
108 Ontario Trustee Act RSO 1990 ch T-23 s 20
109 M Cantin Cumyn “Reflections regarding the Diversity of Ways in which the Trust has been Received or 
Adapted in Civil Law Countries” in L Smith (ed) Re-imagining the Trust (2012) 6 22
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drawn up in his or her name. The trustee can exercise all the rights pertaining to 
the patrimony and may take any proper measure to secure its appropriation.110
If there is more than one trustee, a majority of them may act, unless they 
are required by law to act jointly or in a determined proportion.111 It may 
be that the trustees cannot act by majority, because of an impediment or the 
systematic opposition of some of them. In such a case the others may perform 
conservatory acts, or a trustee may even act alone (with authorisation from the 
court) when immediate action is required. If the situation persists and impairs 
the administration, the court may intervene to resolve the situation.112
Trustees are solidarily liable for their administration, unless their duties have 
been divided by law, the trust deed or the court and the division has been respected, 
in which case each trustee is liable for his or her own administration only.113
A trustee may delegate his or her duties or be represented by a third 
person for specific acts, but may not generally delegate the conduct of the 
administration or the exercise of a discretionary power, except to his or her 
co-trustees. A trustee is accountable for the person selected by him or her if, 
among others, he or she was not authorised to make the selection. If the trustee 
was so authorised, he or she is accountable only for the care with which the 
person was selected and the instructions issued.114
3 6  Summary of comparative analysis
By way of summary it can be stated that, regarding the first issue, the 
principle in South Africa is clear: trustees must act jointly. However, the trust 
deed may allow decisions to be made otherwise, for example by majority 
decision. In England, trustees must act jointly, unless otherwise authorised by 
the trust deed. In Scotland, the trust deed may lay down rules for the conduct 
of the trust’s affairs, but in the absence of such rules, the trustees need not act 
jointly and may make decisions by majority vote. This rule is subject to the 
qualification that all trustees must be consulted. However, a failure to consult 
any trustee will not result in a contract entered into by the trustees with a third 
party, who dealt onerously and in good faith, being void. Third parties are 
thus protected. In the rest of Canada, trustees must act jointly, unless the trust 
deed provides otherwise. In Québec, decisions may be taken by majority vote, 
unless trustees are required by law to act jointly. Under certain circumstances 
fewer than the majority may also act.
Therefore, in South Africa, England and the rest of Canada, trustees must 
in principle act jointly, unless the trust deed provides otherwise. In Scotland 
and Québec, a majority is sufficient to take a decision.
Regarding the second issue, namely delegation, South African trustees may 
delegate their administrative functions to others, but remain responsible to 
supervise the actions of the person to whom they have delegated. Fundamental 
110 Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 ch 64 art 1278
111 Art 1332
112 Art 1333
113 Art 1334
114 Art 1337
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decisions must be taken by the trustees, though. Although a grey area may arise 
regarding the distinction between administrative functions and fundamental 
decisions, the principle is clear enough. However, in South Africa it is certainly 
possible that, if a trust deed allows it, one of a number of co-trustees may 
be authorised by the remaining trustees to conclude a contract (or contracts 
of a specified nature) on behalf of the trust. This could be one of the more 
effective ways of avoiding the practical difficulties with the application of 
the joint-action rule. In England, every trustee must act personally, although 
the trustees may (collectively) delegate some of their functions, as specified 
in the relevant legislation, to an agent. The trustees’ ability to delegate their 
functions may be curtailed in the trust deed. Trustees also have duties of 
supervision in relation to an agent. In terms of legislation (or if allowed in 
terms of the trust deed), an individual trustee may also delegate the execution 
or exercise of his or her powers or discretions. In Scotland, trustees may, in 
terms of legislation, appoint law agents and factors unless prohibited by the 
trust deed. However, the common law in Scotland also allows a trustee to 
appoint an agent, provided that the trustee does not surrender his or her own 
judgment in matters committed to his or her discretion. Thus, a trustee may 
appoint an agent if a person of reasonable prudence dealing with his or her own 
affairs would consider such employment appropriate. In terms of Canadian 
law, trustees may delegate their functions under certain circumstances. 
The test laid down by Waters regarding the circumstances under which 
delegation may take place (namely that policy decisions must be made by 
trustees themselves) corresponds closely to the position in South Africa 
(where fundamental decisions must be taken by the trustees). Arguably, the 
position in Scotland (where trustees may not surrender their own judgment) 
is comparable. Furthermore, in all three of these jurisdictions trustees may 
never delegate all of their functions, as it would amount to an abdication of 
responsibility. Legislation in some Canadian provinces allows the trustees to 
employ certain agents. In Québec, a trustee may delegate his or her functions 
or be represented by a third person for specific acts, but may not delegate 
generally the conduct of the administration or the exercise of a discretionary 
power, except to his or her co-trustees.
Therefore, in South Africa, England and the rest of Canada the trustees 
may delegate some of their lesser functions, but not the more important ones 
(although the distinction between these two categories of functions is not 
always clear). In Québec, delegation of general administration or exercise of 
a discretionary power may take place, but only to co-trustees. In Scotland, an 
agent may be appointed, either in terms of statute or common law, but trustees 
may not surrender their own judgment.
4  Concluding remarks: lessons for South Africa?
The point of departure in this article was that the application of the joint-
action rule can cause significant practical difficulties in the administration 
of trusts in South Africa, especially in the context of business trusts. This 
is because the nature of trusts in a business or commercial environment 
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normally dictates an active role for the trustees in the day-to-day running 
of the particular business. We have also attempted to show that the concept 
“business trust” covers a wide spectrum of business activities, but that a 
number of fundamental trust features can explain the popularity of the trust 
institution irrespective of where on this spectrum the particular business may 
find itself. Regarding the difficulties posed by the unqualified application of 
the joint-action rule in this context, we have highlighted the two mechanisms 
that have emerged in an attempt to ameliorate these difficulties. These 
mechanisms are, first, the possibility that a trust deed can contain a provision 
abrogating the joint-action rule (for example, by making provision for a 
majority decision); and, second, the possibility that certain trustee functions 
can be delegated to a co-trustee or an outsider. The fact that these mechanisms 
are available, illustrates the “flexibility of design in matters of governance”115 
that is so typical of the trust.
It is clear, however, that difficulties remain and that South African courts 
are still facing challenges in developing this area of trust law. For the most part 
these difficulties can be explained by the natural limits that basic trust law 
principles dictate in the employment of the mechanisms mentioned above. We 
have therefore suggested that a comparative analysis of the treatment of these 
issues in a number of other jurisdictions might provide guidance in this regard 
(and might also be of assistance to trustees and other trust practitioners). This 
comparative analysis clearly illustrates that South Africa is not the only trust 
jurisdiction where the joint-action rule applies and where mechanisms have 
been developed to address the difficulties experienced with this rule.
The analysis shows that there is a remarkable degree of similarity between 
South Africa, on the one hand, and the other jurisdictions, on the other, as 
far as the basic application of the joint-action rule is concerned. But there 
are some interesting and at times subtle differences as well. For example, it 
is instructive to note that the default position in both Scotland and Quebec is 
that a majority vote is allowed, unless the trust deed contains provisions to the 
contrary. If one compares the South African approach (where trustees must 
act jointly, unless the trust deed provides otherwise) to the Scots approach 
(where majority vote is allowed, unless the trust deed provides otherwise), it 
is clear that both ensure flexibility, in that the settlor can change the default 
rule if he or she regards it as necessary.
At first blush it might seem as if adoption of the Scots approach might 
solve the dilemma that often arises in practice, namely that of trustees 
who rely on deficiencies in form or lack of authority116 in order to escape 
unwanted obligations. However, the South African case of Van der Merwe NO 
v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (“Van der Merwe”) illustrates that this will not 
always be the case. In Van der Merwe, the trust deed did allow the trustees to 
take a decision by majority vote (which would be the default position in terms 
of Scots law). Yet the two trustees, who managed the trust as if there was no 
third trustee (which, in fact, there was), could not bind the trust. The court held 
115 See part 2 above
116 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 29  
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that a majority decision is only valid if it was taken at a meeting of trustees 
of which all the trustees had received notice. It was evident that the third 
trustee was never notified about any meetings and the remaining two trustees 
could therefore not validly resolve to enter into a contract.117 This is a clear 
illustration of the qualification formulated by Cameron JA in Parker, namely 
that the majority of trustees remains part of the full trustee complement and 
that they must exercise their will in relation to that complement.118 In terms of 
Scots law, all the trustees would have to be consulted even though a majority 
decision is in principle allowed. It therefore seems that the Scots approach 
would not, after all, offer more protection to third parties than would be the 
position in terms of the South African approach.
However, Scots law has a useful statutory provision regarding the protection 
of third parties in case of non-compliance with the joint-action rule. This 
provision, section 7 of the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921,119 would clearly cover 
many of the practical scenarios that have caused difficulties in the South 
African context. It may be argued that the Scots provision has the same effect 
as the Turquand rule would have if it is to apply to trusts in South Africa,120 
namely that third parties would be protected against the non-compliance by 
the trustee in what is essentially internal matters.121 Scotland therefore provides 
an example of a jurisdiction that has opted to include a statutory provision to 
protect third parties against non-compliance with the joint-action rule. In the 
light of the uncertainty regarding the applicability of the Turquand rule to 
trusts, the Scots provision could provide a broad scheme for a South African 
statutory provision aimed at the protection of third parties.122 But whether such 
legislation will be introduced in South Africa remains to be seen.
There are also numerous analogies between South African law and the 
other jurisdictions regarding the issue of delegation of functions. But it is 
nevertheless clear that in some of these other jurisdictions legislation generally 
plays a much bigger role than is the case in South Africa. Especially the English 
legislation regarding delegation of functions to other trustees or agents is 
quite detailed and it provides a rich source of ideas for the development of this 
area of South African trust law. Of special significance in this regard are the 
special rules that apply if an agent is authorised to act as asset manager for 
the trustees.
117 Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC) para 16  The same outcome will 
be reached on the facts of Steyn v Blockpave (Pty) Ltd 2011 3 SA 528 (FB)  For a more comprehensive 
analysis of Van der Merwe NO v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC) in the wider trust 
law context, see A van der Linde “Debasement of the Core Idea of a Trust and the Need to Protect Third 
Parties” (2012) 75 THRHR 371 373-380  
118 See part 3 1 above
119 See part 3 3 above
120 Whether the Turquand rule applies to trusts in South Africa appears to be unresolved; see Man Truck & 
Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor 2001 2 SA 562 (NC) 526; Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 3 SA 486 
(SCA); Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA); Van der Merwe NO v 
Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 5 SA 555 (WCC)  
121 An examination of the differences and similarities between these two rules falls outside the scope of this 
article
122 It is to be noted that s 20(7) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 contains a statutory version of the Turquand 
rule which applies to companies, in addition to the common-law Turquand rule
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SUMMARY
The “joint-action rule” in South African trust law entails that all trustees must act jointly in order 
to bind the trust. Non-compliance with the rule will most often lead to the invalidity of a contract 
between the trustees and an outsider. Hence, in the context of business trusts, the application of the 
rule may be particularly problematic. We submit that the main reason why the business trust remains 
a useful institution is that the trust brings with it, through the importation of certain standard features, 
important advantages that need not be specifically bargained for. However, normal rules of trust law, 
such as the joint-action rule, must also be complied with. Hence, mechanisms to ameliorate some of 
the problematical effects of this rule can be put in place, such as provisions stipulating that decisions 
can be taken by a majority of the trustees, or that the trustees can delegate certain defined duties or 
powers. It is clear, however, that difficulties remain and that South African courts are still facing 
challenges in developing this area of trust law. But South Africa is not the only trust jurisdiction where 
the joint-action rule applies and where mechanisms have been developed to address the difficulties 
experienced with this rule. Comparing the position in South Africa to that in England, Scotland and 
Canada (including Québec), a remarkable degree of similarity between South Africa, on the one hand, 
and the other jurisdictions, on the other, as far as the basic application of the joint-action rule is 
concerned, can be noted. However, there are a number of differences as well. In many of the other 
jurisdictions legislation generally plays a much bigger role than in South Africa and it may provide a 
rich source of ideas for the development of this area of South African trust law.
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